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BAR BRIEFS

REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Bowman County vs. State Bonding Fund et al. County Treasurer,
bonded in sum of $50,000 with State Bonding Fund, wrongfully overdeposited county funds in F. & M. Bank, which became insolvent. The
County Commissioners discovered such over-deposit three months later,
and made demand for deposit according to law, and two weeks later
presented a claim to the Bonding Fund. The claim was verified by the
Chairman of the Board, and attested by the County Auditor. In the
meantime a depositor's claim was filed with the Receiver of the Bank,
but no payment had been made on such claim. HELD: That claim
against the Bonding Fund is properly made when presented by the
Board of Commissioners, which has supervision over the Treasurer,
and that it would be purposeless to require both the Auditor and the
Board to file the same claim; that the filing of a claim with the Receiver
of the Bank does not establish waiver of rights against the Bonding
Fund, but is a defense only to the extent of payment by the Receiver.
-0-

Gamble - Robinson Co. vs. Mauratis. Defendant operated a restaurant and confectionery, buying the business and equipment on credit
and giving mortgage to secure the debt. Stock in trade was purchased
from plaintiff, also on credit, and sold out in usual course of business.
Defendant found it difficult to meet his obligations and applied most
of his receipts to current expenses and the mortgage on furniture and
fixtures. Plaintiff levied attachment on ground, "defendant has sold,
assigned, transferred, secreted or otherwise disposed of, or is about to
sell, assign, transfer, secrete or otherwise dispose of his property, with
intent to cheat or defraud his creditors, or to hinder or delay them in
the collection of their debts." HELD: That while defendant's acts
constituted disposition of his property, no inference to sustain an attachment under fourth subdivision of Section 7537, 1913 Laws, could
be drawn therefrom; that actions of defendant were wholly consistent
with his legal rights, and plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof.
-0-

Berggren vs. Callahan et al. Defendant C. gave M. Bank two
mortgages on realty, one for $I,5oo and one for $2,ooo, the former
being recorded a few minutes prior to the other. P. Bank in Minnesota, acting for plaintiff and others, had dealings with Bank M. over
a period of years in the purchase of such securities, there being definite
written understanding between the two banks that only first mortgages
could be so handled. This understanding had been disregarded, subsequently, however, and notes guaranteed by individual officers of
Bank M. had been taken over. The note and mortgage for $2,000 were
so taken, the mortgage showing on its face that it was subject to the
mortgage for $1,5oo, but all correspondence concerning this particular
transaction was either lost or mislaid. As banking conditions became
somewhat precarious, plaintiff's agent requested an abstract and discovered the time of recording. Action in foreclosure was brought and
judgment prayed for decreeing the mortgage a prior lien. HELD:
Plaintiff's complaint, coming a year after mortgage came into his
possession, was afterthought; that fraud can not be presumed or established by mere allegation and proof of suspicious circumstances.
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Meyer et al. vs. Russell. Action to set aside a deed by wife to
husband covering property valued at about $ioo,ooo, on ground of
mental incompentency, fraud and undue influence, non-delivery or if
delivered it was delivered conditionally and to take effect after grantor's death. The record is voluminous and the opinion reviews the evidence at some length. The facts, here, must be much abbreviated. Defendant, a paper hanger, painter and carpenter, was married to grantor
in 19o6, much to chagrin of the plaintiffs, grantor's brother and sisters
of half blood. At the time of the marriage grantor owned property valued at $35,ooo, accumulated by her and her first husband. By careful
attention, upkeep, and the exercise of good business judgment in selling,
trading and re-building, the estate had increased to about $2o0,ooo at the
time of grantor's death. Russell and his wife had frequently quarrelled,
using rather vile epithets, over business matters, but there had never
been any suggestion of separation or divorce, and the last quarrel was
on the date of grantor's breakdown in May, 1922. From that date
until her death, in October, 1923, grantor had various sinking spells,
and, during the summer of 1922 the plaintiffs were advised of her condition and came to visit. The latter part of June, 1922, the attending
physician advised the defendant that his wife desired to make a will,
but none was made, although defendant employed an attorney, who
conversed with Mrs. Russell for some time and was informed that she
hadn't thought much about it and did not wish to make a will. The
attorney's conclusion was that she was not competent. In November,
1922, a deed covering property valued at about $ioo,ooo was prepared
by Attorney Wood who, accompanied by a Notary, went to grantor's
home, where the deed was executed in the presence of witnesses, acknowledged and delivered to defendant. Defendant at the time paid
Mrs. Russell $io.oo, the balance of the consideration being given as
love and affection. Mrs. Russell's replies to questions concerning the
description of the property listed in the deed and the voluntary nature
of her act were indicative of her condition at the particular time. The
question by the attorney, "You are by this deed conveying the majority
of your property to your husband, is that what you want to do ?" was
answered by "Yes, papa and I have talked it all over and we have a
complete understanding, and that is what I want to do." She also
recognized certain descriptions by giving the particular name, as
"Palace Hotel" and answered the question whether deed was to be
delivered to defendant by "Yes". In signing, her hand was guided by
defendant, but, on request of the attorney, she subsequently made her
mark. Much evidence was introduced concerning mental capacity and
dissension, but practically all of it related to periods other than the
time of execution and delivery of the deed. Several experts were
called, whose testimony was not considered of great value by the trial
court or the reviewing tribunal. The testimony of Mrs. Russell's attending physician over a period of years was largely excluded on objection of defendant, likewise testimony of nurses acting under direction of the attending physician. HELD: There was a valid execution and delivery of the deed; and that it was not a testamentary disposition void under the statute relating to wills; that privileged communications to a physician include communications to or heard by an
assistant or agent of the physician, and no unfavorable inference can
be drawn against a party for objecting to the introduction of privileged
testimony; that the burden of establishing by a preponderence of the

BAR BRIEFS

evidence the grantor's mental incapacity at the time of the execution
and delivery of the deed was not sustained by plaintiffs. The judgment of the trial court was reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS
Loss of sight is not "total" where, by use of glasses, a large percentage of vision may be attained.-Travelers' Insurance Co. vs. Richmond, 291 S. W. 1085 (Texas March 1927).
-0

Where the employment exposes a workman to a greater risk than
that to which the public is exposed in an earthquake injury is compensable.-Enterprise Dairy Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 254 Pac. 274
(Cal. Feb. 1927).
-0-

The fact that an injured employee does not know the full extent
of the injury sustained by an accident does not avoid the prescription
that claim can not be filed after one year.-McLaughlin vs. Western
Union, 17 Fed. 574 (La. Feb. 1927).

Where tuberculosis results from pneumoconiosis as consequence
of inhalation of dust during employment, the injury and every consequence of the injury arose in course of employment.-Cishowski vs.
Clayton Mfg. Co., 136 Atl. 472 (Conn. March 1927).
-0

A bricklayer, employed by laundry company to wall up a pit near
two wells in which pumping equipment is to be installed is not an
employee engaged in the usual or ordinary business of the employer.Oilmen's Reciprocal Association vs. Gilleland, 291 S. W. 197 (Texas
Feb. 1927).
-0

Person operating repair shop, frequently eiployed by trucking
company to fix furniture injured in course of its trucking operations,
even though not an independent contractor, is engaged in work that
is casual and not in the usual course of employer's business.-York
Junction Transfer Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 254 Pac. 279 (Cal.
Feb. 1927).
-0

Average weekly wages of an injured person, for purpose of compensation, must be ascertained by past earnings and not by what may be
earned in future, and proper method of determining such wages where
employee works holidays and Saturdays is to divide total wages by
number of weeks worked.-White vs. Pinkerton Co., 291 S. W. (Tenn.
March 1927).
-0

A drapery hanger who, in the discharge of his duties, had to travel
by train from place to place, was killed by a fellow passenger who was
shooting at the conductor, and the widow was denied compensation on
the ground that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.-Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Peek, 137 S. E. 121 (Ga. March
1927).
-0

Widow of employee received compensation for death of husband
injured in course of employment, and, on refusal of insurance carrier
to sue third party liable, brought suit and recovered, but the insurance

